Life sciences · Preprint
arXiv · September 23, 2026
No summary has been generated for this record yet. What follows is drawn from its source metadata only.
Preprint.
No findings were extractable from the material analysed.
Safety was not reported in the material analysed. Check the source before drawing any conclusion about harm.
The source did not state who this applies to in practice.
Graded across the dimensions that decide whether you should act, each from what the source actually supports. There is no single score, and where a dimension was not assessed it says so.
This record has not been graded across any dimension yet. Treat the label above as provisional and read the source.
What is missing. This record has no bottom line, key findings, reported figures, evidence dimensions. That is a gap in the analysis, not a judgement about the study.
Benchmarking and routing platforms increasingly act as intermediaries connecting large language model providers with end-users. However, providers on these platforms typically use a fixed price per token, preventing users from achieving the most competitive price for their tasks. % workloads. In this work, we design a procurement platform where token prices for each task are driven by provider competition, enabling users to secure competitive pricing for guaranteed quality levels. To this end, the platform sequentially routes queries via a reverse second-price auction that incentivizes model providers to truthfully bid their best estimate of the average cost to serve a user's query. As it routes queries, the platform learns the quality offered by each provider and progressively routes queries to the most cost-competitive provider among those meeting a desired quality threshold. To validate our design, we conduct experiments with multiple LLMs from the \texttt{Llama} and \texttt{Qwen} families on popular mathematical reasoning and question-answering benchmarks. The results show that the pricing margin of the most cost-competitive provider on our platform varies significantly---from $10\%$ to $71\%$---depending on the task and quality threshold. This suggests a substantial inefficiency in the current fixed-price market, and it demonstrates that our platform may enable users to capture maximum savings whenever competitive market conditions permit.