Loading
Life sciences · Preprint
arXiv · September 17, 2026
No summary has been generated for this record yet. What follows is drawn from its source metadata only.
Preprint.
No findings were extractable from the material analysed.
Safety was not reported in the material analysed. Check the source before drawing any conclusion about harm.
The source did not state who this applies to in practice.
Graded across the dimensions that decide whether you should act, each from what the source actually supports. There is no single score, and where a dimension was not assessed it says so.
This record has not been graded across any dimension yet. Treat the label above as provisional and read the source.
What is missing. This record has no bottom line, key findings, reported figures, evidence dimensions. That is a gap in the analysis, not a judgement about the study.
We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them. The principal may use any bounded outcome-contingent payment vector, and the agent's best response can make expected profit discontinuous in those payments. For every fixed number $m\ge2$ of outcomes, the minimax regret over $T$ rounds is of order $T^{m/(m+1)}$, up to logarithmic factors. The upper bound allows arbitrary action spaces and agent heterogeneity, without smoothness or monotone-surplus assumptions. Its key is an effective-dimension reduction that the benchmark can be normalized even when fixed tie-breaking is not shift invariant, after which revealed preference yields a monotone response map in payment-difference coordinates. A learning policy built on a Lipschitz parametrization of this map attains the rate using only observed outcome categories. The lower-bound construction accounts for how incentive losses accumulate across outcome dimensions. It shows that each additional contractible outcome creates a precise and unavoidable increase in the worst-case cost of learning.